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Economics at the Hebrew Univeristy of Jerusalem.AlleviAting  Transitory  Food  Crises  in  Africa:
International  Altruism  and  Trade
Food  aid  has  long  been  used  as  an  instrument  to  help  low-income  countries
sustain domestic food supplies  and cope wlth transitory  or  chronic food
insecurity.  It  was also  used  with the  intentions  of accelerating  agricultural
development  and increasing  food production.  But food aid has been heavily
criticized  in  the  last  decade  on the  following  grounds:
*  The  international  response to  food  crises is  slow, meager, and
inefficient. A.A  related  accusation  suggests  that  emergency  food  aid is
discriminatory,  and  depends  on the  political  and  economic  orientation  of
the  recipient  country.)
*  Food  aid  is  a  disincentive  for  domestic  food  production  and  leads  to long
term  dependence  on donors.
*  -Food  aid depresses  commercial  imports  of food, reducing  overall food
availability.
*  By alleviating  shortages  food  aid  enables  countries  to  postpone  or even
cancel  politically  costly  economic  reforms. These issues  are  discussed
in the  literature  on food  aid  (see  Stevens  1979;  Singer  and  others  1987;
Hopkins  1984;  Wallerstein  1980;  Bhagwati  1986;  Srinivasan  1989;  and  Lavy
1990).
This  paper  focuses  on criticism  about  the  use of emergency  food  aid in
Sub-Saharan  Africa. More specifically,  it examines  the  response  of the  donor
community  to  unexpected  or transitory  drops  in domestic  food  production  in 26
countries.  The  study  compares  the  role  of  food  aid  and  commercial  food  imports2
in offsetting  these shocks  and covering  the shortfall  in food consumption.
Finally,  I  test  several  hypotheses  that  postulate  the  factors  that  deteLmine  the
tendency  of donors  to respond  to the  needs  of different  countries. The study
uses  data  for 1979-87,  a period  with fairly  reliable  figures  on emergency  food
aid flows  and  agricultural  production.
The  results  suggest  that  food  aid  and  commercial  food  imports  stabilize
food consumption  and neutralize  the effects of random shocks to domestic
production.  Food aid compensates  for up to 50 percent  of the drop in food
production;  imports  make  up  an  additional  30  percent. In  other  words,  every  one-
ton  drop in cereal  production  is  offset  by the  delivery  of 0.8  tons  of cereal
and  dairy  products  from  abroad. There  is,  however,  a lag  in  this  response  over
a four-year  period,  although  most  of the  aid is  received  in  one  to two  years.
The results  with regard  to the accusation  that emergency  food aid is
discriminatory  are  quite  surprising.  The  international  response  to food  crises
in  Sub-Saharan  Africa  is  not  contingent  on the  form  of government  or the  level
of  political  and  human  rights  violations.  On  the  contrary,  countries  classified
as socialist  with military  governments,  and  that  have a low  score  in terms  of
protecting  political,  economic,  and  civil  liberties,  tend to receive  more aid
in  emergencies.
The paper is organized  as follows:  The first section  documents  the
stylized  facts  of food  insecurity  in Africa  and shows  the  relative  importance
of  emergency  and  total  food  aid  to  food  production  and  food  shortages.  Section
2 suggests  an empirical  framework  for the estimation  and analysis  of the
correlation  between  food  aid  and  food  production;  the  results  are  presented  in
Section 3.  The  final section elaborates  on  the economic and political3
determinants  that  affect  the  global  response  to  the  emergency  needs  of  countries
in  Africa.
I.  TRANSITORY  FOOD  INSECURITY:  THE  STYLIZED  FACTS
Unexpected  transitory  reductions  in food  production  can  have  a dramatic
effect  on food  consumption.  Several  mechanisms  are  available  to stabilize  food
consumption,  including  commercial  food supplies  anaa  emergency  imports  of food
aid.  Both  options  have  been  used to  stabilize  food  consumption  in  Sub-Saharan
Africa,  where  food  supplies  have  been  unstable  over the  last  decade.
Table  I  summarizes  the  coefficients  of  variation  (net  of  trend)  of  cereal
food  production  averaged  over  1970-87. The  countries  of the  Sahel  (Mauritania,
Mali,  Burkina  Faso,  Niger,  Sudan,  Ethiopia,  and  Somalia)  had  the  largest  annual
fluctuations,  followed  by Botswana,  Madagascar,  and Tanzania. Note that the
variability  in  the  latter  years  is  much  higher,  reflecting  the  1983-85  drought.
Output  for  even  the  most  stable  food  producers  in  Africa fluctuates  more  sharply
than in  most other  developing  countries. 1
The  variability  of cereal  production  parallels  a declining  trend  in  per
capita  cereal  production. Table 2 summarizes  annual  growth  rates for grain
production  and population  from 1970 to 1982.  East and West Africa  had the
highest  rates  of population  growth  and the lowest  rates  of cereal  production
growth.  As a result  per capita  cereal  production  declined  by -2.2 and -0.8
percent  a  year in  East  and  West Africa  respectively.  Cereal  production  was  up
1.8  percent  in East  Asia  and  the  Pacific  Rim,  and  1.6  percent  in  the  industrial
economies,  however.
1"The  Challenge  of Hunger  in  Africa:  A  Call to  Action."  1988. World  Bank,
Washington  D.C.4
TABLE  1:  EMERGENCY  AND REGULAR  FOOD  AID,
CONMERCIAL  FOOD  IMPORTS,  AND  VARIABILITY  OF PRODUCTION
Country  Variability  Emergency  Total  food  Food imports
of production  food  aid  as a  aid  as a  as a percentage
percentage  of  percentage  of production
total  food  aid  of  production
Angola  21.3  50  9  84
Burundi  21.8  9  10  4
Benin  22.6  18  2  19
Burkina  Faso  39.2  25  3  8
Botswana  77.6  13  195  808
Central  African
Republic  15.9  10  2  17
Chad  20.3  59  8  10
Cameroon*  13.8  21  1  18
Comoros*  20.0  5  19  124
Congo*  35.8  0  10  862
Cape  Verde  99.8  77  1,450  219
Ethiopia  34.6  59  9  8
Gambia  27.7  34  10  57
Ghana  23.9  18  7  30
Guinea-Bissau  56.3  50  13  24
C6te  d'Ivoire  23.7  20  1  26
Kenya  32.4  23  2  11
Lesotho  26.4  6  20  82
Liberia  22.8  0  0  38
Madagascar  26.4  27  1  10
Mauritius  105.7  2  805  9,530
Mauritania  43.4  54  111  525
Mali  36.8  31  6  13
Ma.awi  33.5  20  1  2
Mozambique  13.7  68  9  60
Rwanda  21.1  23  3  6
Senegal  29.9  45  10  65
Sierra  Leone  12.2  5  2  18
Somalia  42.6  81  29  71
Sudan  48.8  60  6  20
Tanzania  52.8  26  3  8
Togo  18.4  8  2  19
Uganda  33.9  47  1  3
Zaire  25.7  46  1  35
Zambia  25.1  67  1  23
Zimbabwe  43.8  87  1  6
*
*These  countries  are not included  in the  empirical  analysis  in the next
section.5
TABLE  2:  GRAIN  PRODUCTION  AND  POPULATION  GROWTH,  1970-82
Grain
Grain  production
Region  production  Population  per  capita
World  2.3  1.8  0.5
Industrial  economies  2.5  0.7  1.6
East  Africa  0.8  3.0  -2.2
West  Africa  1.9  2.7  -0.8
East  Asia and  Pacific  3.5  1.7  1.8
South  Asia  2.7  2.4  0.3
Latin  America  3.2  2.4  0.8
Source:  Poverty  and  Hunger.  1986. Washington,  D.C.:  World  Bank.6
Africa's  negative  growth  rates  were  somewhat  offset  by  an increase  in  the
flow  of food  aid and food imports  (table  1),  which  add an average  12 and 15
percent, respectively, to total domestic production.  Cape Verde, Mauritius,
Mauritania,  and  Somalia  depend mainly  on  food  aid; Angola,  Congo,  Cambia,
Mozambique,  Senegal,  and  Zambia  primarily  on  food  imports.  Observation  suggests
that  countries  with  a high  coefficient  of variation  of  production  receive  more
aid. The simple  correlation  coefficient  between  variation of  production and food
aid is 0.45.  This result  is even stronger when the ratio of total aid  is
replaced by emergency aid.  It appears that low domestic output triggers donor
aid --  mostly emergency help.  The same analysis suggests that countr.es with
food shortages tend to import  part of the food  deficit.  In this case the  simple
correlation coefficient is only 0.25 for total aid, and 0.31 for emergency aid.
The next section outlines an approach to the  empirical analysis of aid and trade
in smoothing food consumption in Africa.
II.  THE EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK
This  section  describes  the  relationship  between emergency  food  aid  or food
impo)rts  and transitory changes in domestic production. 2 Since negative shocks
to domestic  food  production  are  exogenous  anJ  are  the  primary  trigger of
international  emergency  food  aid,  which is  endogenous,  the  potential simultaneous
relationship between food aid and food production is  not relevant.  This is also
the  case for the effect of transitory  output shocks on emerger.cy  commercial food
2 The broader question of the relationship  between total financial  aid and
emergency situations in developing countries, and ia Africa in particular, is
analyzed in Lavy (1987).7
imports.  Here,  however,  negative  as  well  as  positive  s'.ocks  can  lead  to  a  change
in imports. As a result  trade  can serve  as a symmetric  stabilizer  (both  for
positive  and  negative  shocks)  of food  consumptioa,  while  emergency  aid is  used
only as a buffer  in the  event  o' foui.  shortages. This trade  mechanism  works
mainly through imports,  since food exports  are negligible  in most African
countries.
More  formally,  let  y denote  the  transitory  component  of food  production,
E denote  emergency  aid, and M denote  emergency  imports.  Based  on the above
discussion,  the  response  functions  have the  following  form
k
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where  y is  a threshold  beyond  whic.h  an output  shock  will  trigger  a flow  of food
aid  or  a food  import  response. This  threshold  is  probably  different  in  the  two
response  functions  (E and M) and it may vary from country  to country.  The
emergency  aid response  model can be treated  as a limited  dependent  variable
model.  More specifically  it is  a tobit  model,  with E  taking  positive  or zero8
values. Not all the  cases  in which  E  has  a zero  value  are  directly  observed,
since  the  value  of  E in  a  given  period  may  reflect  a lagged  response  to  previous
shocks. So we actually  may observe  very few  cases  where E is equal  to zaro,
rendering  the  estimation  of a tobit  mrAel  impossible. An alternative  view  of
the  response  model  or framework  is  as a switching  re&ime  model. One  regime  is
the  case  of  negative  output  shocks  triggering  food  aid. The  other  is  for  small
negative  shocks  or posiclve  shocks  that do not lead to aid flows.  Several
difficulties  arise  in  estimating  such  a  model. First,  since  the  threshold  level
is  unknown,  the  switching  model  is  with  unknown  regimes. Second,  the  yt  shocks
are  unobserved  and  must  be estimated. Third,  the  form  of the  E and  M response
functions  may  be  jointly  dependent,  so  that  the  P's,  the  T's,  and  the  6's  should
be jointly  estimated. Fourth,  the  lagged  response  of foreign  aid  and impo:ts
to output  shocks  may be very important,  implying  the need to allow for an
unrestricted  lag  structure.
To obtain  a measure  of the  output  shocks,  an autoregressive  model  with
a time  trend  for  food  production  is  estimated  separately  for  each  country.  The
residuals  from these regressions  are then used as yt in the two response
functions. In  the  Et  function  a  spline  is  used  so  that  only  the  negative  values
of yt are used to explain  the variance  of E, while the coefficients  on the
positive  values  of y  are  const  ned  to  be zero. This  means  that  the  threshold
is  constrained  to  be  equal  to  zero. This  approach  is  preferred  over  the  one  that
is  based  on the  estimation  of  a  switching  model  with  an  unknown  threshold,  since
it  allows  greater  freedom  in  exploring  both  the  lag  structure  and  the  possibility
that  the  P's  vary  across  countries.  Some  flexibility  in  the  threshold  is  allowed
by introducing  nonlinearity  in  the  effect  of  y on E.  It  might  be expected  that9
the  response  Oor  small  negative  shocks  is  minimal  or even  nil,  while  increasing
as  y gets  larger  (but  negative).  Adopting  this  auproach  of  making  the  response
directly  sensitive  to  the  size  of  the  shock  amounts  to  basically  ha ing  different
#'s for  different  countries  (as  long  as  the  shocks  are  of  different  size). This
nonlinearity  is  explored  by adding  to the  response  function  the  square  value  of
y-
The  E and  M equations  can  be estimated  jointly,  using  generalized  least
squares  techniques  to investigate  the  potential  correlation  of ut  with  et ar.d
p4t.  As long as the set  of explanatory  variables  is not identical  in the two
equations,  efficiency  is gained  lirough  joint  estimation. If the E equation
includes  only the  negative  values  of  yt(-y"),  while  the  M equation  includes  two
distinct  variables  y"  and  yP  (positive  y  values),  the  above  condition  is  met  and
the  seemingly  unrelated  estimated  is  applied.
The crucial  variable  for  the  estimation  of the  model  is  emergency  food
aid. This  variable  is  available  for  1979-87  for  all  the  Sub-Saharan  countries.
Given this short time series,  a separate  estimation  for each country  is not
possible  and therefore  data were pooled.  As noted above the existence  of
differences  in the parameters  across  countries  may be important.  Since  the
response  function  does  not include  constants,  the  fixed  effect  model  is ruled
out.  The alternative  random  error  component  model  may  be appropriate,  though
it is difficult  to estimate  for a system of two equations.  Instead,  an
alternative  approach  to the  fixed  effect  or the  random  component  model  is  used
that allows the 6's to vary according  to characteristics  of the recipient
country.  The response  functions  are therefore  augmented  with an interaction
variable  betwe-n  the  yt's  and  the  z's,  which  denote  country  characteristics  as
detailed  below.10
Food  aid 3 is  divided  into  three  categories  --  emergency  aid,  program  aid,
and project aid.  Each of these categories  is subdivided  into cereal  and
noncereal  aid.  All figures  are in tons  of grain  or grain  equivalent. Since
African  data involve  large  measurement  errors,  the  price  and  output  data  must
oe  interpreted  with  care. The  only  extended  food  output  and  input  data  available
for  most  of Sub-Saharan  Africa  is total  cereal  production.  This  series  is  used
to estimate  random  shocks  to domestic  production  and imports.  Since  several
countries  received  no emergency  food aid, or received  aid for only a short
period,  the  sample  includes  those  26  countries  that  received  some  emergency  food
aid  for  an  extended  period  (see  table  1).
III. INTERNATIONAL  ALTRUISM:  THE  EXTENT  AND  SPEED  OF THE  RESPONSE
Table 3 estimates  the  cereal  and  noncereal  emergency  food  aid response
functions. The  number  of  observations  is lower  than  the  product  of the  number
of  both countries  and  years  because  for  certain  years  there  are  missing  values
for  emergency  aid. Each  equation  included  the  contemporaneous  and  three  lagged
values  of the  negative  as  well as the  positive  shocks  of output. The results
were  not at all sensitive  to variations  in the  specification  used to estimate
the  output  shocks. As suggested  earlier,  positive  shocks  to  output  should  have
no effect  on  emergency  aid. Indeed,  the  hypotheses  that  the  coefficients  of  the
positive  shocks  and  the  constant  are  equal  to  zero  were  accepted  at  the  5  percent
significance  level. For example,  the  F statistic  for  the  hypothesis  that  all
the  YPvariables  have zero  coefficients  is  0.621. Since  the  tabulated  value  of
3 The  World  Food  Program  supplied  aid  data  for  this  study.1  1
F4, 117 at  the  5  percent  level  of  significance  is  2.45,  the  null  hypothesis  has  to
be  accepted.  That  is,  the  evidence  suggests  that  the  addition  of  contemporaneous
and lagged positive output shocks, regardless  of the lag length, do not
contribute  to  the  explanation  of  variations  in  current  emergency  aid  flows. The
acceptance  of zero constants  in the equation  also means that there is no
autonomous  level  of emergency  aid.
Table 4 presents  the least-squares  best estimate  of the aid response
function,  excluding  all the positive  shocks.  Experiments  with various lag
patterns  and length  show that  all emergency  aid is received  over a four-year
period from the date of the initial shock.  The contemporaneous  partial
correlation  is  negative,  but  not  significantly  different  from  zero. The  sum  of
the  lag  coefficients  is  equal  to  -0.45,  suggesting  that  every  one-ton  reduction
in  domestic  grain  production  is  compensated  by almost  half  a  ton  of  grain  in  the
form of emergency food aid.  But most of this --  more than 60 percent
--  arrives  the  year  after  the  negative  shock. Some  of this  lag  in  response  may
reflect  the sluggish  reaction  of the donor  community. But since  the output
shocks  may  be correlated,  they  could  also  induce  a lagged  effect  of  Yt- 1 on Et.
For example,  if the output  shock  is caused  by a severe  drought  that forces
farmers  to  leave  their  farms  (temporarily),  the  following  year's  crop  could  also
be affected.
Table 5 shows similar data for emergency  noncereal  aid.  Although
noncereal  flows  are  marginal,  they  make  up 5  percent  of all  emergency  food  and
help  insulate  consumption  from  extreme  random  shocks.  The  timing  of  the  response
is similar  to that  of cereal:  most noncereal  aid arrives  the year after the
negative  shock.
Before  evaluating  the  effectiveness  of  aid  using  the  above  results,  note12
TABLE  3:  POSITIVE  AND  NEGATIVE  PRODUCTION  SHOCKS:  ASYMMETRY
Cereal  Noncereal
Constant  -783.0  532.4  -
(0.0)  (1.2)
YPt  0.027  0.026  -0.001  0.001
(0.6)  (0.6)  (0.1)  (0.1)
yptlI  -0.017  -0.017  0.001  0.001
(0.4)  (0.4)  (0.1)  (0.2)
yp,t-2  -0.126  -0.126  -0.011  -0.011
(1.9)  (1.9)  (1.4)  (1.4)
'^e.3  0.048  0.048  0.003  0.004
(1.5)  (1.5)  (0.7)  (0.9)
yn,  -0.073  -0.073  -0.008  -0.009
(1.5)  (1.5)  (1.3)  (1.5)
yn,.,  -0.276  -0.276  -0.026  -0.027
(5.9)  (6.0)  (4.4)  (4.6)
't-2  -0.037  -0.037  -0.003  -0.003
(0.8)  (0.8)  (0.5)  (0.6)
y0n;.3  -0.124  -0.124  -0.013  -0.014
(2.7)  (2.8)  (2.2)  (2.4)
0.387  0.471  0.236  0.362
N  126  126  126  126
F  10.875  15.025  5.826  9.924
Note:  YP  denotes  positive  output  shocks  while  Yn  denotes  negative  shocks.
t  values  are in  parentheses.13
TABLE  4:  EMERGENCY  FOOD  AID:  CEREALS
Constant  15223.0  --  5671.8  --  2107.4  --
(1.6)  (0.5)  (0.2)
ynt  -0.031  -0.046  -0.037  -0.043  -0.005  -0.007
(1.0)  (1.5)  (1.2)  (1.5)  (0.2)  (0.2)
ynt-1  -0.275  -0.292  -0.253  -0.257  -0.278  -0.280
(7.1)  (7.8)  (6.6)  (6.9)  (7.1)  (7.3)
yn,-2  _  . -0.102  0.109  -0.071  -0.073
(2.9)  (3.3)  (1.9)  (2.0)
't-3  --  --  --  --  -0.091  -0.092
(2.2)  (2.3)
0.315  0.40  0.355  0.44  0.374  0.46
N  126  126  126  126  126  126
F  19.7  27.78
Note:  t  values  are  in  parentheses.14
TABLE  5  EMERGENCY  FOOD  AID:  NONCEREALS
Constant  2873.3  --  2052  --  1656.3  --
(2.5)  (1.7)  (1.4)
yn,  -0.006  -0.009  -0.007  0.009  -0.003  -0.005
(1.7)  (2.5)  (1.9)  (2.5)  (0.8)  (1.1)
Ynt- 1 -0.023  0.027  0.029  -0.023  -0.024  -0.026
(5.0)  (5.8)  (4.6)  (4.9)  (5.0)  (5.4)
yn,-2  --  --  -0.009  -0.011  -0.005  -0.007
(2.5)  (2.8)  (1.2)  (1.5)
yn,-3  --  --  --  --  -0.010  -0.091
(2.0)  (2.2)
R2 0.204  0.312  0.228  0.350  0.245  0.367
N  126  126  126  126  126  126
F  11.131  19.283
Note:  t  values  are  in  parentheses.15
that  there  were several  missing  values  of emergency  aid. When a  missing  value
was replaced  by a zero value, however,  the sample size increased,  and as
expected,  the  accumulated  aid response  declined  (to  0.35 for  cereals  and  0.04
for  noncereals). For  the  level  of  emergency  aid,  note that  the  estimates  have
a threshold  level  of zero. This  implies  that  every  reduction  in  output,  beyond
that  expected  according  to  the  long  term-trend,  is  assumed  to  trigger  emergency
aid. In  reality,  however,  emergency  aid  is  provided  only  when the  reduction  in
output  falls  beyond  a threshold  that  is less  than  zero.  If this  threshold  was
allowed  empirically  to  be  different  from  zero,  the  response  would  be larger  than
0.45.  Indeed,  when the  square  value  of Y was included  in the  function,  some
form of this nonlinear  response  was significant,  leading  to a higher total
response. Similar  higher  responses  were  estimated  when  different  --  less  than
zero --  threshold  levels  were  chosen.
With respect  to the sluggishness  of the aid mechanism,  the difference
between  the  crop  year  in  which  output  is  recorded,  and  the  calendar  year  in  which
aid is recorded,  implies  an overlap;  some  of the 0.28  response  at t-l really
arrived  at t.  So contrary  to  criticism,  emergency  food  aid  does  help insulate
domestic  food  grain  consumption  from  random  shocks  to  domestic  production.  But
the  flow  of aid  that  arrives  too  late  may  cause  a  proolem. If  the  output  shock
has  a short  life,  the  late  emergency  aid  may  actually  arrive  during  a  period  of
normal  food  production,  and  it  may  have  a  negative  effect,  pushing  food  prices
lower. Our  estimate  suggests  that  this  "late"  flow  --  if there  is  any--is  very
small,  both relative  to total  aid  and to total  production,  and thus  cannot  be
very  harmful.
Random shocks to domestic  consumption  may also induce a  stabilizing16
response  through  changes  in imports. The import  response  can  be induced  by an
increase  in  domestic  food  prices  relative  to  prices  elsewhere. This  mechanism
reduces  food  shortages  in  a  free  trade  regime. But  since  many  African  countries
do not have free trade  regimes,  and imports  and  food  prices  are  controlled  by
the  government,  changes  in  relative  prices  are  very limited. Table  6  summarizes
the parameters  of the commercial  import  response  to production  shocks.  The
dependent  variable  is  the  deviations,  both  positive  and  negative,  from  the  trend
of  imports  derived  from  the  estimation  in  a first  stage  for  each  country. Trade
serves  as  a symmetric  buffer:  cereal  imports  fall  in  good  times  and  rise  in  bad
times.  The response  is larger  and  more significant  in years  of need:  over a
four-year  period  imports  affect  almost  38  percent  of  any  unexpected  output  drop.
The contemporaneous  response  is nil; most of the compensation  occurs  in the
following  year. Again,  this  reflects  to  some  extent  the  difference  between  the
calendar  year  and  the  crop  year.
Trade  shipments  and  aid  deliveries  compensate  countries  for  64  percent  of
the  reduction  in  food  within  a year  after  the  negative  shock. Over  four  years
(excluding coefficients that  are  not  statistically  significant), total
compensation  is about  80  percent. The  next section  examine  some  dimensions  of
the  hypothesis  that  there  is d'scrimination  in the  response  to emergencies.17
TABLE 6:  TRADE  RESPONSE TO EMERGENCY  NEEDS:  CEREAL  IMPORTS
All  imports  Commercial  imports
Constant  -19705.3  --  -22300.4  --
(2.5)  (2.2)
Ypt  0.001  -0.014  -0.036  -0.052
(0.0)  (0.4)  (0.8)  (1.2)
ypt-l  -0.043  -0.051  -0.011  -0.022
(1.1)  (1.2)  (0.2)  (0.4)
ypt-2  -0.080  0.078  -0.095  -0.095
(1.5)  (1.5)  (1.4)  (1.4)
Ypt-3  0.050  0.043  0.027  0.019
(1.9)  (1.6)  (0.9)  (0.6)
Ynt  -0.106  -0.091  -0.048  -0.034
(2.7)  (2.3)  (0.8)  (0.6)
ynt_,  -0.170  -0.158  -0.288  -0.274
(5.0)  (4.6)  (6.0)  (5.6)
ynt-2  -0.054  0.047  -0.063  -0.057
(1.6)  (1.3)  (1.3)  (1.2)
ynt-3  °0.014  0.026  -0.045  -0.032
(0.4)  (0.8)  (1.0)  (0.7)
R 2 0.352  0.330  0.424  0.408
N  144  144  126  126
Note:  t  values  are in  parentheses.18
IV.  EC NOMIC  APD  POLITICAL  DETERMINANTS  OF GENEROSITY
The global  response  to these  needs  for  emergency  aid  varies. The total
flow  of emergency  aid  from  all  donor  countries  and  international  organizations
may be influenced  by political  and economic  considerations. This section
identifies  some  of the  factors  that  determine  the  global  response  to  food  needs
in Sub-Saharan  Africa.
The  coefficient  of response  is  a function  of several  factors,  z;,  such
that
y  - 43y,  +  E6y,z 1 +  uj
where yi is the negative  shocks  to production  and the second term is the
interaction  term  that  allows  the  response  to  vary  with z.
The  paper  tests  the  following  set  of hypotheses:
(1)  The poorer  the country  the more generous  the response. Country
poverty  is  proxied  by per  capita  income  and food  consumption.
(2)  Donors  are more responsive  to the  needs  of countries  that  already
receive  large  amounts  of food  aid. This  hypothesis  is  based  on the  assumption
that  established  food  aid  flows  have  organized  channels  of  transmission,  making
emergency  aid  more  effective  and  less  costly. A related  factor  is the  cost  of
transportation,  which  in  Africa  is  mostly  a function  of the  land  component  of
transportation.  Inland  countries  may receive  less  aid  because  transportation
costs  are  higher.
(3)  The West's response  depends  on the political  orientation  of the
recipients. The  socialist  countries  include  Angola,  Benin,  Guinea,  Mozambique,
Ethiopia,  and  Tanzania. This  hypothesis  was  tested  by enlarging  this  group  to19
include  mixed socialist  countries:  Madagascar,  Rwanda,  Sudan,  Burkina  Faso,
Zambia,  Congo,  Mali,  Somalia,  and  Togo.
(4)  The political  rights and civil and economic  liberties  in the
recipient  country  may influence  the donor  community. Emergency  aid  may also
depend  on the form  of government. To test these  hypotheses,  we used Gastil's
(1984)  ranking of African countries  according to political rights, civil
liberties,  and  state  of freedom.  The first  two  indices  rank  countries  from  one
(best)  to seven  (worse),  while the  third  index  characterizes  countries  as not
free,  partially  free,  or fully  free. Most  countries  in  Africa  are  between  five
and  seven. The  exceptions  are  Botswana,  Ghana,  Mauritius,  Nigeria,  Senegal,  and
Zimbabwe. Countries  ruled  by a  military  regime  are:  Togo,  Chad,  Liberia,  Niger,
Ghana,  Central  African  Republic,  Mauritania,  Burkina  Faso,  and  Ethiopia.
Given  the  large  multicollinearity  between  all  these  variables,  their  impact
on B had to )e estimated  one at a time.  When the effect  was suspected  to
originate  from  a correlation  with  a third  variable,  that  variable  was added  as
a control  in the  regression.  Table  7 summarizes  the  results  of including  z as
an interaction  with  the  output  shocks  in the  aid  equation. The  table  indicates
the  sign  of the  effect  and  whether  it is significantly  different  from  zero  at
the  5  percent  significance  level. The  first  two  columns  present  the  results  for
emergency aid in the form of cereals and noncereals.  The signs of the
coefficients  are the  same for  the  two  types  of food  aid,  not surprising  given
the high correlation  between the  two.  Almost all the coefficients  are
statistically  different  from zero  and generally  they are  more precise  in the
noncereal  equation  (lower  standard  errors  for  the  coefficients).
With  regard  to economic  determinants,  the  hypothesis  that  the  response  is20
better for poorer  countries  is accepted  for both cereal  and noncereal  aid.
Replacing  the  GNP  per  capita  measure  of  poverty  with  more food-related  poverty
measures, such as per capita food production  or per capita daily cereal
consumption,  did  not  produce  any  significant  results.  The  /i  coefficient  varied
greatly  with the  average  level  (as  a share  of domestic  production)  of regular
food  aid  received:  countries  with  a  high  share  of food  aid  received  more  aid  in
crisis  situations. If low-income  countries  tend  to receive  more nonemergency
food  aid,  however,  the  correlation  between  emergency  aid  and income  per  capita
could  be erroneous  (given  the  high collinearity  between  the two  components  of
food  aid).  Nevertheless,  the  income  effect  in the  response  equation  remained
unchanged  even  when  income  per  capita  was  controlled  for  in  the  estimation.  This
robust  result  can  be interpreted  as follows:  The  response  to emergency  needs  is
correlated  positively  with  the  ease  (low  cost)  of  delivering  food  aid,  and  this
cost  of  transportation  and  delivery  tends  to  be lower  for  countries  that  receive
high levels  of nonemergency  aid.  This premise is further  supported  by the
significant  contribution  of geographical  location  (inland  or on the  sea)  to the
variance  of the response  to  output  shocks. The  emergency  needs  of the  inland
countries  do not  meet  with the  same  generosity  as those  with seaports.
A  completely  different  interpretation  of  the  positive  partial  correlation
of / and regular  food aid is possible.  Emergency  food aid is not only an
additional  food  supply,  part  of  it is  in  fact  regular  food  aid  under  a different
name.  This  nonadditionality  may  be more  significant  in  countries  that  receive
more regular  food  aid.  We cannot  test  this interpretation,  nor do we address
the  related  hypothesis  that  emergency  food  aid  is  not  additional  but is  part  of
nonfood  financial  aid.21
The results  for  the  political  and  social  variables  are  quite  surprising.
The international  response  is  not  contingent  on the  form  of government  or the
level  of political  and human rights  violations. On the contrary,  countries
classified  as socialist,  with  military  governments,  and  a  low  score  in  terms  of
protecting  political,  economic,  and  civil  liberties,  tend  to receive  more aid
(higher  /'s) in emergency  or crisis  situations. This tendency  is probably  a
result  of the  high correlation  between  some  of the  other  determinants  of 0  and
the political and human rights factors.  Indeed, socialist  countries  and
countries  with restricted  political  and  economic  freedoms  are  at the  lower  end
of  the  income  distribution  in  Africa. Their  0  is  higher  because  they  are  poorer,
and  the  world  does  not  punish  them  in  times  of  crisis  and  despair.  Regular  flows
of  food  aid,  however,  are  highly  negatively  correlated  with  socialist  or  military
governments,  and poor protection  of civil,  economic,  and political  freedoms.
This  evidence  on  nondiscrimination  may  be  biased  since  some  countries  with  severe
food  crises  did  not  receive  any  emergency  aid  and  therefore  are  not  included  in
the  sample  (for  example,  Burkina  Faso  and Congo). The results  may therefore
suffer  from  sample  selectivity  biases.
Table  7  shows  the  results  from  reestimating  the  import  response  function,
but  it  includes  only  the  negative  shocks  to  output  (the  positive  values  were  not
significant)  and their  interaction  with  all  z's. Surprisingly,  this  estimation
is almost identical  to the aid equation,  although  it was expected  that the
market-oriented  economies  would be more likely  to import  food for emergency
needs.  We find  just the  opposite. The  T's  of the  nonsocialist  countries  are
higher. This somewhat  unexpected  result  could  reflect  the  fact that  the  very
poor socialist  countries  finance  emergency  comercial  imports  with general
financial  aid  or  with  balance  of payments  relief  aid.22
TABLE  7:  FACTORS  AFFECTING  THE  RESPONSE  OF AID  AND  TRADE
Emergency  food  aid  Comercial  food  imports
(Negative
Cereal  Noncereal  shocks)
GNP  per capita  (-)  (-)'  (-)*
Nonemergency  food  aid  (+)  (+)*
Food  aid
Access  to sea  (+)  (+)*  (+)*
Socialist  (+)*  (+)*
Semi-socialist  (+)  (+)  (+)
Military  government  (+)  (+)*
Political  rights  (+)*  (+)*  ( F)*
Civil  liberties  (+)*  (+)*
Status  of  freedom  (+)  (+)*
*  In these  cases  the  interaction  term  was significantly
different  from  zero (at  a  - 0.05).
Note. (+)  means  a  positive  correlation;  (-)  is  negative.23
V . CONCLUSIONS
Several  studies  have interpreted  the  negative  simple  correlation  between
food aid and domestic  food  production  as an indication  that food aid  has a
negative  effect  on domestic  production.  This study demonstrates  that this
correlation  is largely  due to the  response  of emergency  food  aid flows.  The
dynamics  of domestic  food  production  are the  exogenous  changes  that  cause  and
trigger  the  flow  of food  aid.  So these  flows  should  be treated  as endogenous,
and  they  should  be netted  out  from  total  food  aid  in  an  exercise  that  evaluates
the  efficiency  o.,  food  aid.
This analysis  of African  countries,  the  major  recipients  cf global  food
aid, suggests  that  on average  a shock  to agricultural  output  in the form  of a
one-ton  drop in cereal  production  would lead  to a flow  of 0.64 tons  within  a
year.  Extending  the period to four years increases  the compensation  to 80
percent. This estimate  is  biased  downward,  however,  since  the threshold  that
was assumed  to trigger  emergency  flows  was  only  zero.
Food  aid  accounts  for  about  60  percent  of  total  emergency  flows;  the  rest
is in the form  of commercial  imports. Given  that some imports  are  also aid-
financed,  the  role  of  aid  in  alleviating  food  crises  in  Africa  is  very  important.
The  pattern  of aid  flows  does  not  provide  any  evidence  of discrimination
by  donors. Even  countries  that  do  not  protect  human  or  political  rights  receive
an equal  amount  of aid  during  acute  food  shortages.24
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